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1. Introduction 
 
An economy with stable bank credit is in a situation without economic reasons for 
cycles of credit expansion or contraction. Lending cycles appear when funding by banks 
concentrates in specific periods of time but in other periods only scarce funding is 
available for real-economy projects. In good times, banks follow lax credit policies with 
lower credit standards, and, so negative-NPV loans increase. During recessions, when 
banks are burdened with many nonperforming loans, banks tighten credit standards and 
may refuse to give positive-NPV loans (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006). Therefore, the 
cyclicality of bank credit is a crucial determinant of the volatility of real activity, output 
and employment. 
 
Current literature focuses on the foundations of credit cyclicality, and the crucial role of 
the variations in credit supply in explaining the evolution of the business cycle, see 
Holmström and Tirole (1997), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), and Diamond and Rajan (2005), among others. But the current literature is less 
informative about the role played by the market for credit risk transfer as a possible 
reason influencing the credit cyclicality. 
 
In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in the literature, by studying the extent to 
which the trading in the most popular credit derivative instrument, the Credit Default 
Swap (CDS), affects the incentives of banks about lending, securitization, borrowing, 
and leverage. We present implications for the cyclicality of the bank credit supply and 
for the volatility of economic activity, by using a theoretical model based on a limits-to-
arbitrage framework (Shleifer and Vishny ,1997). 
 
The Credit Default Swap (CDS), introduced in 19971, has become the most popular 
credit derivative contract. Market size measured by gross notional amount decreases  
since its largest in 2007 (60,000 $ billions) and is around 9,500 $ billions in the last 
quarter of 2017. A CDS is a contract between two parties, the protection buyer and a 
protection seller whereby the protection buyer is compensated for the loss generated by 
                                                          
1 The origin and initial purpose of CDS (invented by Blythe Masters, an executive at J.P. Morgan) was to 
exploit differences between the regulation of banks and insurance companies thus profiting from 
regulatory arbitrage, Kay (2016). 
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a credit event (default of the reference entity, lack of payment of a coupon or other 
corporate events defined in the contract) in a reference credit instrument. In return, the 
protection buyer pays a premium, equal to an annual percentage s of the notional, to the 
protection seller. The premium s, quoted in basis points or percentage points of the 
notional, is called the CDS spread2. This spread is paid (semi)annually or quarterly in 
arrears until either maturity is reached or default occurs, at which point the protection 
seller pays the protection buyer the face value of the reference asset minus its post-
default market value, through physical or cash settlement.  
 
The economic costs and benefits of CDS contracts are the subject of intense debate. 
Extensive surveys are Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) and Dias 
(2015). Anderson (2010) points out that although CDS may give social benefits in risk 
sharing and price discovery, these benefits may be undermined if the contract is prone 
to manipulation or if does not deal with counterparty risk. Heyde and Neyer (2010) 
posit that CDS trading increases the cyclicality of the banking sector in almost all 
economic scenarios because banks increase their investments in illiquid and risky assets 
and CDSs may create a channel of contagion.  
 
However, the discussion in the literature about the role played by the CDS in the 
lending and securitization processes in the banking sector is scarce. Our main 
contribution in this paper is filling this gap. Specifically, we study the extent to which 
the mispricing in CDS contracts (and in securitized assets) affects the incentives of 
banks on securitization, borrowing and leverage and its implications for the cyclicality 
of the supply of bank credit and for the volatility of economic growth. We do so in a 
limits-to-arbitrage framework. The main message in this paper is that the mis valuation 
of credit-risk-sensitive financial assets has (mostly negative) effects in the real 
economy. 
 
The key implications are as follows. Unlevered securitization together with mispricing 
of securitized assets boosts lending cyclicality, induces credit crunches and amplifies 
the cyclicality of the supply of bank credit, particularly when overpricing appears. If we 
                                                          
2 The 2009 CDS Big Bang (U.S.) and Small Bang (E.U.) protocols standardized premium payments. For 
instance, the fixed (yearly) premium payments for U.S. single-name CDS are either 50 or 100 basis 
points, and any difference relative to running par spread is settled through an upfront payment. 
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include leverage, the volume of real activity and the profits of the banking sector 
increases, but banks sell securities when markets decline. This selling puts further 
pressure on falling prices. 
 
Regarding the economic impact of credit derivatives, trading in mispriced CDS reduces 
the amount of funding available to real-economy projects, in special those with high 
default risk. Trading in CDS decreases the liquidity of the securitized assets, and 
especially those based on investments with high credit risk. Banks consider buying 
naked CDS an attractive choice to lending to entrepreneurs in situations of financial 
stress when the cost of financing increases and counterparty risk is high. So, trading in 
CDS will decrease the amount of financing available to real-economy projects, so 
decreasing economic growth and employment. 
 
Although we use a similar partial equilibrium model, our results are more general than 
the ones in Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 2010) because they do not consider securities 
with credit risk. We generalize their model by introducing credit-risk-sensitive assets 
and credit derivatives. In a paper related with ours, Heyde and Neyer (2010) show that 
CDSs reduce the stability of the banking sector both in recessions and booms because 
they incentive banks to increase their investment in risky credit portfolios and may 
create a possible channel of contagion. We extend their results by showing the 
interaction between leverage, securitization and, CDS and their impact on the credit 
supply cyclicality. 
 
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews current literature. In Section 3 we 
introduce a limits-to-arbitrage partial equilibrium model. Section 4 summarizes the 
main results, discusses some empirical implications and suggests further research lines. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The possibility of CDS trading having effects at the aggregate level of the economy and 
the supply of bank credit has received attention in the literature.  Although not many 
banks use CDS contracts (BIS, 2012), these banks are the bigger, the most systemic and 
the more interconnected. Thus, problems in the big banks could leak to other smaller 
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banks and may affect the overall banking system. The economic costs of banking crisis 
can be sizeable (for instance, the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods 
are 15–20% of annual GDP, Hoggart, Reis, and Saporta, 2002) and so this issue is of 
paramount importance but has received little attention in the literature until recent times. 
  
In a prescient paper, Allen and Carletti (2006) show credit risk transfer can lead to 
contagion and contribute to financial crises. Cont (2010) argues  the impact of credit 
default swap markets on financial stability depends on clearing mechanisms and capital 
and liquidity requirements for large protection sellers. In particular, the culprits are not 
so much speculative or “naked” credit default swaps but inadequate risk management 
and supervision of protection sellers. When protection sellers are inadequately 
capitalized, CDS markets may act as channels for contagion and systemic risk. On the 
other hand, a CDS market where all major dealers take part in a central clearing facility 
with adequate reserves may contribute to mitigating systemic risk.  Avellaneda and 
Cont (2010) suggest increased transparency in CDS markets benefits uninformed 
traders, while informed market participants (large dealers, market makers, and some 
large buy side firms) are likely to bear its costs. 
 
There is controversy whether naked CDSs have played an important and direct role in 
destabilizing the financial system since 2007. Duffie (2010) argues naked trading on 
sovereign European CDS has not driven up Eurozone sovereign costs. He suggests that 
a regulation restricting speculative CDS trading3could reduce market liquidity, raise 
execution costs, lowering the quality of information provided by the CDS market and in 
the end increase sovereign borrowing costs. Heyde and Neyer (2010) posit  CDS trading 
increases the cyclicality of the banking sector in almost all economic scenarios because 
banks increase their investments in illiquid and risky assets and CDSs may create a 
channel of contagion. The evidence in Das et al. (2014) suggests  the advent of CDS 
was largely detrimental to firms because bond markets became less efficient and 
experienced no improvement in liquidity. Caglio et al. (2016) report that banks sell 
more credit protection than they buy for the firms in their loan and securities portfolios, 
so doubling the bet instead of hedging. This is the opposite of what we should expect if 
the reason to use CDS were to hedge credit risk. 
                                                          
3 Such as the BaFin May 2010 ban in Germany on speculation against Eurozone sovereign bonds either 
through naked CDS or short bond positions 
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Mayordomo et al. (2014) discuss the inconsistency of CDS prices from different 
providers. The role of CDS in price discovery is analyzed in Forte and Peña (2009) and 
Mayordomo et al. (2011) analyze the impact of financial distress on the liquidity and  
the price discovery process. 
 
Summing up, although some theoretical papers predict  trading in CDS may increase 
financial instability, in the best of our knowledge, is scarce empirical evidence on the 
actual impact of CDSs on financial stability, economic growth, and systemic risk. 
Rodriguez-Moreno, et al. (2014) report , before the subprime crisis, holdings of credit 
derivatives by U.S. banks decreased systemic risk. However, after the crisis, these 
holdings increased banks’ systemic risk. The impact of credit derivatives on systemic 
risk is significant but small. In fact, the proportion of non-performing loans to total 
loans and the leverage ratio have a much stronger impact on systemic risk than the level 
of holdings of credit derivatives. We should also stress that a key research question, the 
aggregate welfare effect of the CDS markets has received scant attention in the 
literature so far. 
 
3. The Model 
 
Given the scarce literature on the total impact of CDS on the cyclicality of bank credit, 
in this section, we present a limits-to-arbitrage model to analyze this problem. By the 
cyclicality of bank credit, we mean that there are economic reasons for cycles of credit 
expansion or contraction. Therefore, the cyclicality of bank credit exists when the 
funding of real-economy projects by banks concentrates in specific periods of time, but 
in other periods of time, there is almost no funding available for real-economy projects. 
Therefore, the cyclicality of bank credit is a crucial determinant of the volatility of real 
activity, output and employment. 
 
We rely on three key assumptions. First, banks know the true default probability of a 
loan and this is private information that banks do not share with other agents. The 
justification for this assumption is the expertise banks should have in testing credit risk. 
Second, and given our first assumption, banks know whether market prices of 
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securitized assets are above or below their fundamental values, and they use that 
information in their trading decisions. And third, the activity of the noise traders 
deviates market prices from fundamental values and banks, given our assumption of 
limits to arbitrage, are not able to put right at once and completely this market 
mispricing. 
 
 
3.1. A Model of the cyclicality of bank credit: Loans, Securitization, Leverage and 
CDS  
 
We work with a partial equilibrium model, with limits to arbitrage, based on the basic 
framework of Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 2010). However, we generalize the model by 
introducing credit risk and markets that allow credit risk transfer. Additionally, some 
suggestions in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Duffee and Zhou (2001),  Heyde, and 
Neyer (2010)  and Bolton and Oehmke (2011) are taken into account.  
 
The model has three periods: 1, 2, and 3. The agents in the model are entrepreneurs and 
banks. Besides banks, other non-informed agents (noise traders) take part in the 
securitized loan market and in the credit risk transfer market. All agents are risk neutral 
and risk-free rates are zero. In this economy, there are various financial contracts: loans, 
securitized assets, short-term borrowing, and credit derivatives4. They can trade the 
loans in the market as securitized assets and we allow for temporary mispricing, caused 
by noisy traders, in the spirit of the limits-to-arbitrage literature. In our model, 
securitization is the sale of cash flow claims. The banks can leverage their investments 
by borrowing in the financial markets.  
 
They can purchase the credit derivative instrument in the credit transfer market at a 
price s, pays off w units (the loss given default of the loan) if the loan defaults at 
maturity and zero otherwise. We assume that the current practice of full collateralization 
of credit derivatives instruments5 is the norm in the credit transfer market. We define 
the credit derivative instrument as a CDS because mimics the structure of existing CDS. 
                                                          
4 We do not derive optimal financial contracts and simply assume that a reduced-form version of these 
contracts exists. 
5 See Augustin et al. (2014) 
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We study the consequences of the behavior of the different agents and the impact of the 
financial contracts for the cyclicality of lending decisions in the banking sector and the 
influence of this on the real economy. 
 
3.1.1. Investment Projects 
 
The entrepreneur presents for consideration investment projects to banks in periods 1 
and 2 and all projects pay off in period 3. Each project costs €1 to undertake. There are 
two kinds of projects, good and bad. A project Z starts at t=1, 2 , and pays an amount Zi  
in t=3. This amount can be Zg ≥ €1 (if Z is a good project) with probability 1 - Z or Zb = 
0 (if Z is a bad project) with probability Z . The default probability of project Z denoted 
as Z and the project’s payoffs are exogenously fixed and known by banks. The supply 
of projects costing €1 and yielding Zi is infinite, so their development only depends on 
the availability of funding.  
 
The expected value of a project Z at time t=1, 2 is then  
 
 E(Z) = (1-Z ) Zg + Z Zb  (1) 
 
We assume that entrepreneurs cannot get finance from the financial markets and 
therefore all projects are financed by banks6. When a bank finances a project (for 
instance the Z project)  charges a fee of  fZ  to the entrepreneur at t=1,2 and receives 
from him a repayment Ri i=g,b at t=3 This repayment can be Rg = €1 or Rb = 0 in which 
case the entrepreneur defaults and the bank assumes the losses. The fee depends on the 
credit quality of the project:  
 
fK = g( Zi)  (2) 
 
with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 depending on the competitiveness of the banking sector7 and we require 
∂g/∂ > 0, so the higher the project’s default probability the higher the required 
                                                          
6 The major external source of finance for firms comes from banks and other financial intermediaries as 
suggested in Matthews and Thompson (2008). In our model entrepreneurs do not have previous 
reputation and the amount of capital they have plays no role in their financing.    
7 A perfectly competitive banking sector implies   = 0. We also require  fZ < 1 . 
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proportional fee8. We assume that the entrepreneur pays the fee from his personal 
funds9. The simplest case is a situation in which the fee is proportional to the expected 
loss of the investment. Here fK =E*LGD*DP where E is the exposure, LGD is the loss 
given default and DP is the default probability. In our case, this is equal to fZ = €1*1* 
Z  that is, fZ = €Z 10. 
 
   
3.1.2. Banks 
 
The representative bank starts the period t=1 with E0 in equity. The government 
regulates the banking industry and sets compulsory capital requirements to safeguard 
financial stability. The bank faces a capital-asset ratio e = Et/Nt where Et is equity 
capital and Nt is loaned to entrepreneurs. We define Nt as the number of projects the 
bank finances at time t =1,2 and Et is the remaining bank’s equity at the end of period t 
=1,2,3. 
 
The bank can hold cash, invest in financial securities or lend money to entrepreneurs. 
We denote Ct the amount of cash  the bank holds at the end of period t and we assume 
C2=C3=0 because there are no investment opportunities beyond time 2. To gain 
exposure to credit risk the bank can do four things. First, the bank may sell CDSs. 
Second, the bank may buy financial contracts based on securitized loans. Third, the 
bank may buy naked CDS. Finally, the bank may lend money to entrepreneurs for 
investment projects, in which case  the bank collects the fee up front and receives the 
repayment Ri at maturity t = 3. The bank can do three things with those loans. First,  the 
bank can keep them on its books without hedging the credit risk. Second, the bank can 
securitize the loans and sell them in the market for securitized assets11. Finally, the bank 
can keep the loans on its books but hedging the credit risk by buying CDSs. Given that 
some loans are bad we assume that when the bank sells a loan in the market, the bank  
must keep a fraction d of the loan on its books. We assume d=h(Z)  and  ∂h/∂Z > 0, so 
                                                          
8 Assuming ∂g/∂g > 0 implies that the entrepreneur and the bank agree to share the expected surplus 
although this condition is not necessary for the main results in the paper. 
9 We assume that fZ is lower than €1 because otherwise the entrepreneur does not need banks to finance 
his project.  
10 Shleifer and Vishny (2010) assume that the entrepreneur and the bank split the surplus from the project, 
but in their model,  there is no credit risk, in which case a linear parameterization of (2) is f = (Zg – 1).    
11 We do not consider packaging and tranching. 
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the higher the project’s default probability the higher the fraction the bank keeps in its 
books. The fraction d is  named the “skin in the game” when the bank securitizes loans. 
If the bank finances N projects, the bank must hold dN of these securities on its balance 
sheet for at least one period after underwriting.12 
 
After securitizing a set of loans and keeping a fraction d in its books, the bank sells the 
(1-d) remaining securities in the market. We denote by Pt,Z , t=1,2,3 the market price of 
the securitized assets based on project Z at time t. Given that each securitized asset 
corresponds to a loan of €1 with a terminal value equal to Rg or Rb at t=3, its rational 
price must always be  
 
P = Pt,Z = E(Ri) = (1-Z )  i=g,b ; t=1,2 (3) 
 
or in other words, the project’s success probability. Market prices of securitized assets 
can deviate from (3) because of investor sentiment coming from a variety of sources 
unrelated to fundamental value.  We talk about mispricing in more detail in section 
3.1.3. below. We assume that banks understand the model, including that the 
fundamental value of the securitized asset is P. The bank has an incentive to securitize 
loans at t = 1, 2 only if  Pt > P. If this is the case, the bank generate and sells loans at t, 
and collects profits,  Bt = (Pt - P)(1-d) per loan and distributes (Bt+f)g  in fixed 
proportions (e.g. 50/50) which are set exogenously as dividends and employee 
compensations (bonuses) where g≤1. Banking regulations can influence the part of 
retained profits (1- g) for instance setting countercyclical reserve provisions. Just as the 
bank sells assets when market prices are above the fundamental value, the bank may 
underpriced securities, that is when Pt < P. If this is the case, the bank buys loans at t, 
and collects profits Bt = (P- Pt) per loan and distributes (Bt)g  as before. In both cases, 
banks’ trading acts as a stabilizer of market prices but, given our assumption of limits to 
arbitrage, they are not able to put right the mispricing. 
 
Recall that in this model, banks lend money to real-economy projects in periods 1 and 2. 
In the first period, banks lend a part x of their funds to entrepreneurs and in the second 
                                                          
12 This is the usual practice in the banking industry as documented in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) who 
find that the most common arrangement is for the bank to retain a portion of the loan which is greater for 
riskier categories of loans 
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period banks lend a part (1 – x). Full stability of bank credit is when x = (1- x). Extreme 
cyclicality in bank credit is when x = 0 or x = 1. 
 
Additionally, we address the question of how the bank finances its operations, besides 
its equity cushion. There is one source of financing in our model, short-term borrowing 
in the capital markets. The bank can borrow in financial markets using the securities it 
holds as a collateral Jt. We assume that the collateral can be sold at any time, so the 
bank’s lenders see these loans as a safe investment. We denote by Lt the stock of 
borrowing by the bank from the market at time t=1, 2, 3. Lenders to the bank want that 
the bank maintains a constant haircut h in the form of securities on its debt and therefore 
Lt = (1-h)Jt.  
 
In the following sections we first consider the case of h=1, so there is no short-term 
borrowing in the market and w=0 which implies that no credit risk protection is 
available. We compare baseline lending (d=1) with securitization (d <1). We ask when  
is profitable to the bank to finance everything at t=1 and save no cash for t=2, even 
when additional projects become available at t=2. Then we talk about the impact of 
retained profits and capital requirements, introduce leverage and  we address the impact 
of introducing CDS contracts.  
 
3.1.3. Mispricing 
 
Market prices of securitized debt may deviate from the rational price (3) because of the 
investor’s sentiment coming from a variety of sources (shifts in investor’s psychology, 
regulatory rules, and market design) which are unrelated to fundamental payoffs13. For 
example, in the case of two equal securitized assets when one of them receives a rating 
from a Credit Rating Agency but the other does not. Given the current Basel regulatory 
framework which favors investment in securities with ratings, because unrated 
securities attract a high capital charge, most investors will prefer securities with a rating, 
increasing their prices in comparison with those of unrated securities. The deviation can 
be also in the opposite direction, for instance when unusual events cause investors to 
                                                          
13 For a review on indicators of market sentiment see Baker and Wurgler (2007). The BW sentiment 
index is a contrarian predictor. In the case of loans and bonds they are probably like low sentiment beta 
stocks. In a period of high sentiment, they may be relatively underpriced and perform better than average 
going forward, and vice-versa. 
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lose confidence in their valuation models and they react dumping securities (Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy, 2008). Market sentiment is especially prevalent in situations of 
Knightian uncertainty where information is too imprecise to be summarized adequately 
by probabilities. Informed agents (banks in our model) cannot put right market 
mispricing by a variety of reasons, such as noise trader risk or credit constraints. This 
gives rise to the phenomena of slow-moving capital to the investment opportunities, as 
emphasized by Duffie (2010). 
 
Therefore, a key element in our model is the possibility that, given market dislocations, 
transactions costs, credit constraints, and other market imperfections, those frictions do 
not allow banks to cut out mispricing in the market and therefore market prices can 
deviate from fundamental values. For instance, with overpricing, potential buyers may 
not have enough financial muscle to buy the assets, there is synchronization risk (Abreu 
and Brunnermeier, 2002) and also the fact that potential buyers sometimes prefer to 
“ride the bubble” instead of correcting it (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). This is the 
basic idea of the limits-to- arbitrage model (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) which has 
received important empirical support, in the stock and bond market see Pontiff (1996), 
Baker and Savasoglu (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003), Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford 
(2002),  Buraschi, Sener, and Menguturk (2011), and Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) 
among others14. Recently additional supportive evidence has been documented in the 
commodities market (Mou, 2011) and in the exchange rates market (Mancini and 
Ranaldo, 2011).   
 
In our model mispricing appear because of the actions of some external (noise traders) 
investors whose demand affect security prices. Security prices depend on the 
assumption that arbitrage is limited and does not drive at once those prices to its 
fundamental value P = E(Ri) = (1- ) with securitized loans or  s =  w with CDS. We 
assume that the banks understand that the fundamental values of securities are P and s at 
all times, but they do not share this knowledge with noise traders. 
 
                                                          
14 For instance, Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) document many instances of persistent (more than three 
months) mispricing on the order of 10-20%. In some markets, they report far greater relative mispricing 
in the period 2007-2009. Buraschi et al (2011) report that in December 2008 Brazil’s euro-denominated 
yield spread on 10-year Eurobonds was nearly 25% higher than the yield spread on the same maturity 
bond  denominated in usd; this difference was only 4% in November 2005. 
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To clarify the mispricing process let’s assume two agents: a bank and a noise trader and 
let’s concentrate in period t=1. In period 1 the noise trader is pessimistic, optimistic or 
neutral about the value of security i , this sentiment is known by all at t=1 and it has size 
 ≥ . When the noise trader is pessimistic15, his period-1 demand schedule for security 
i is given by:  
 
QN1 = (P – )/P1  (4) 
 
Given that the bank has E1 in equity and can also borrow in the capital markets the 
amount L1 the demand schedule for the bank is:  
 
QB1= (E1+L1)/P1  (5) 
 
Since the total demand for the asset must equal the unit supply, the market price is given 
by: 
 
P1 = P –  + (E1+L1)  (6) 
 
If bank’s resources do not bring prices all the way to fundamentals, which implies  > 
(E1+L1), then P1 < P or, in other words, the market price is below the fundamental 
price. Is easy to see that an overpricing appears when one optimistic shock cannot be 
compensated by short positions (because of lack of capital or lack of the suitable 
financial instrument) taken by banks in which case P1 > P.  The change in sentiment 
from period 1 to period 2  −  is random and follows a given symmetric distribution 
D with zero mean and constant volatility  
 
In summary, if banks (i) do not have access to enough debt capital, or (ii) cannot replace 
debt capital with new equity capital, or (iii) cannot take short positions, they cannot 
force the prices of assets to their fundamental values. Therefore, market frictions (e.g. 
credit constraints) limit arbitrage activities. 
 
 
                                                          
15 We only consider the pessimistic sentiment; the optimistic sentiment is symmetric. The neutral 
sentiment is when  =  
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3.2. Lending versus Securitization 
 
In this section, we deal in the first place with the case of traditional lending when there 
are no securitized assets, and market prices reflect fundamental values. In the second 
part of this section, besides traditional lending, banks can trade in securitized assets 
whose prices reflect fundamental values. In the third part, we deal with the case when 
market prices of securitized assets deviate from fundamental values. 
  
3.2.1. Baseline Lending 
 
We start with the baseline case in which the bank only engages in traditional lending 
activities and markets are informationally efficient. The projects available at t=1,2 are 
identical in the sense that the default probability   and the project’s payoffs Zg  and Zb 
are the same in every period16. Therefore the expected value of investing in N projects is 
E(Zi)N, i=g,b. If the bank uses all its balance sheet in t=1, lends out E0 to finance N=E0 
projects and keeps all of them on its books until maturity. The bank collects Nf as fees 
and distributes (Nf)g among equity holders and employees. If the bank invests nothing 
in period 1 and invests all its balance sheet in period 2,  collects the same fees which are 
distributed in the same way as before. Given that interest rates are zero the bank has no 
incentive to concentrate its investment in one given period. Thus, there is no reason for 
cycles of credit expansion or contraction. But, with identical projects, there is no reason 
justifying that the bank should smooth its financing over time. So, the situation may be 
of full stability (all bank financing evenly spread over periods), full instability (all bank 
financing concentrated in just one period) or anything between these extremes17. 
 
Financial regulations, however, can change that situation if different g rates in different 
periods are required. For instance, if regulations say, at period t=1, that g in period 1 
will be lower than in period 2 (for instance because of a policy of dynamic 
provisioning), then the situation changes. On the one hand bank’s equity holders are 
                                                          
16 But in each period projects of different credit quality are available. For instance, a high quality project 
X with X =   and a low quality project Y with Y =    
17 To circumvent this situation Shleifer and Vishny (2010) include some “special” high-payoffs projects 
available every period, but in limited supply, in order to incentive the bank to wait until period 2 and 
therefore smooth its lending between periods 1 and 2. If NH is the number of high-payoff projects 
available in each period, and if E0 ≤ 2 NH , the bank finances E0 /2  projects each period and the situation 
is of complete stability.     
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indifferent between receiving dividends in cash today or its equivalent value as capital 
gains at t=3. But a lower distribution ratio means that a higher amount of profits is 
keeping into the bank as reserves and will eventually increase capital gains18. Therefore, 
equity holders have an incentive to concentrate all the financing in period 1. The bank’s 
managers and employees have a clear incentive to suggest shareholders skip the bank’s 
investments altogether in period 1 and to invest in period 2 as much as possible. 
Whatever the way they resolve this agency conflict (favoring equity holders or 
managers) this situation would hint at some additional cyclicality in the framework of 
traditional lending. 
 
3.2.2. Securitization 
 
We turn to the case where the bank can securitize its loans. If the bank uses all its 
capital at t=1, the bank finances N=E0/d projects and keeps dN securities in its books. 
Notice that given that d<1 then N > E0 so the number of projects is higher than in the 
case with no securitization where N=E0. The profits also increase with respect to the 
baseline case because the bank collects Nf as fees and distributes (Nf)g among equity 
holders and employees. If the bank uses all its capital in t=2, the result is the same. In 
fact, any combination of investments between periods 1 and 2 produces the same result. 
In summary, if market prices are consistent with fundamental values, we are in the same 
situation as in the baseline case, but with more investment projects, more economic 
activity, and higher bank profitability. 
 
 
3.2.3. Mispricing 
 
In this section, we talk about the impact of mispricing in securitized assets, caused by 
changes in the sentiment of noise traders, on the cyclicality of bank credit.  Banks are 
the primary source of securitized assets because they are the originators of loans in our 
model. First, we analyze the implications on banks’ behavior caused by market prices of 
                                                          
18 For instance if distributed profits are allocated in 50/50 proportions to shareholders and employees and 
g=0.2 in t=1 and g=0.4 in t=2, equity holders will receive a total of  0.9(B+f) in dividends and capital 
gains if all investment is concentrated in t=1 but only 0.8(B+f) if all investment takes place in t=2 
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securitized loans above their fundamental values (overpricing) and then we analyze the 
consequences of underpricing. 
 
3.2.3.1. Overpricing  
 
We first analyze the case when P1 > P and P2 = P , so, in the first period, market prices 
of securitized loans are above their fundamental values, but this overvaluation 
disappears in the second period.  
 
In this situation, the bank has a clear incentive to finance and securitize the maximum 
number of the investment projects the bank can afford at t=1 if the profits from selling 
the loans are superior to the cost of origination; that is when P1 – P > 1 – f.  If so, there 
are no incentives to wait for the next round of projects because banks do not have 
private information about future market price P2. The reason is that this price is 
determined by a future change in the sentiment of the noise trader, which is, by 
assumption, unpredictable. This implies strong cyclicality in the lending process, in the 
sense that the bank invests all its capital in loans and later sells securitized assets if 
market prices overstate their true value, at t=119 and therefore, the bank collects fees and 
distributes profits among equity holders and employees at the end of period 1 and does 
nothing in period 2. This implies x = 1, a situation of full instability. Although selling 
activity by banks will depress prices at t=1, so mitigating the overpricing and helping to 
stabilize markets, recall that our assumption of limits to arbitrage prevents the full and 
immediate correction of mispricing. 
 
In the second place, we analyze the case when P1 = P and P2 > P , so, in the first period, 
market prices of securitized loans are at their fundamental values, but there is  
overvaluation in the second period. In this situation, the bank has no specific incentive 
for generating loans or distribute them at t=1, but, given that the bank does not know a 
future market opportunity will appear, the bank may invest all its capital at t=1, (i.e. x = 
1) giving loans to entrepreneurs and keeping these loans in its books. If the bank does 
so, at t=2 the bank lends nothing to entrepreneurs and has a strong incentive to 
                                                          
19 Some evidence on the impact of securitization on housing bubbles can be found in Carbo-Valverde, 
Marques-Ibañez and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012) who claim that mortgage-backed securitization 
together with housing prices were key factors in triggering the banking crisis in Spain. 
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securitize all loans and sell them in the market, so decreasing (but not eliminating) the 
mispricing. If the bank does nothing at t=1 (i.e. x = 0) and waits until t=2,  the bank has 
a clear incentive to finance and securitize all the investment projects at t=2, if the profits 
from selling the loans are superior to the cost of originating them; that is when P2 – P > 
1 – f.  If so, there are no incentives to wait for the next round of projects because at t=3 
there are no new projects. The bank will give loans and will sell securitized assets as 
long as market prices overstate their true value, at t=2 . Although this selling activity by 
banks will depress prices at t=2, so mitigating the overpricing and helping to stabilize 
markets, recall that our assumption of limits to arbitrage prevents the correction of 
mispricing. Notice also that in both cases (either the bank lends everything in period 1 
and sells securitized assets in period 2 or the bank does nothing at t=1 and waits until 
t=2  when the bank  lends and securitizes) there is strong cyclicality in the lending 
process. A third situation is when the bank chooses x = (1-x) as its investment strategy. 
In the first period the bank generates loans and may distribute them, but in the second 
period, the bank will sell all loans as securitized assets.  
 
In the third place, we analyze the case when P1 > P and P2 > P. An additional point here 
is whether banks have perfect foresight and they know at t=1 that P2 > P (and as 
consequence, they know whether P1 is higher or lower than P2) as assumed in Shleifer 
and Visnhy (2010, page 309) or they do not have such abilities. If they have these 
abilities, then their optimal strategy is to concentrate all the originate-to-distribute 
activity in the most profitable point of time (either 1 or 2, i.e. x = 1, or x = 0) causing a 
situation of full instability. If they do not have such abilities, they will concentrate all 
the originate-to-distribute activity at time t=1, causing a situation of instability. 
Therefore, the optimal strategy of banks, despite their foresight abilities, is to 
concentrate all their lending in either period 1 or period 2 and securitize as much as they 
possibly can. In summary, in most cases, the overpricing in securitized assets creates 
strong incentives for lending cyclicality and as a result, there will be an increase in the 
volatility of output, and employment in the real economy. Deviations from fundamental 
values in (credit-risk-sensitive) securities markets impact the real economy through 
changes in the level of activity of the lending channel. 
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3.2.3.2. Underpricing 
 
Next, we concentrate on the case in which P1 < P and P2 = P , so, in the first period, 
securitized assets are undervalued. At t=1 the bank may generate loans, but the optimal 
strategy when P-P1 > 0 is not to sell them. However, the bank does not know whether a 
future market mispricing may appear. Thus, the bank may invest all its capital at t=1 
(t=2), giving loans to entrepreneurs and keeping these loans in its books. If the bank 
follows this strategy, at t=2 (t=1) the bank does nothing. Naturally, the bank can follow 
any intermediate strategy. But underpricing in t=1 discourages banks from entering the 
market for securitized assets, so they behave as if the market does not exist. Recall that 
banks are the only suppliers of securitized assets. So, they do not have incentives to 
trade and there are no counterforces to the market mispricing. In this situation, the 
strategy of shorting the undervalued asset hardly makes sense to banks, and noise 
traders do not generate loans or securitized assets. This situation is like the simple 
securitization situation, as discussed in section 3.2.2. In an additional scenario, at t=1 
the banks lend a part of their capital to entrepreneurs, keep a part of their capital for 
investment in the next period, but do not sell securitized assets. In t=2, banks also 
finance investment projects, so there is little credit supply instability. 
 
The results when P1 = P and P2 < P , depend on the assumptions about the behavior of 
banks in period 1. Let’s consider three possible scenarios. In the first scenario, at t=1 the 
banks lend all their capital to entrepreneurs. In t=2 banks do nothing because they have 
no funds to invest, so the underpricing does not affect their behavior, but entrepreneurs 
receive no financing during this period, so there is credit supply cyclicality. In the 
second scenario, at t=1 the banks lend a part of their capital to entrepreneurs, keep a part 
of their capital for investment in the next period and sell securitized assets to noise 
traders. In t=2, banks buy as much as they possibly can the underpriced securitized 
assets from noise traders and therefore, they are left with little money to finance 
investment projects, so there is also credit supply instability, although a version that is 
milder than in the first scenario. In the third scenario, banks do nothing in t=1, so there 
are no securitized assets available. In t=2 banks lend all their money to entrepreneurs 
but do not sell securitized assets. So, again, there is credit supply instability because 
they concentrate all lending in a single period. 
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When P1 < P and P2 < P , let’s consider three possible scenarios. In the first scenario, at 
t=1 the banks lend all their capital to entrepreneurs and do not securitize the loans. In 
t=2 banks do nothing because they have no funds to invest, so the underpricing does not 
affect their behavior, but entrepreneurs receive no financing during this period, so there 
is strong lending cyclicality. In the second scenario, at t=1 the banks lend a part of their 
capital to entrepreneurs, keep a part of their capital for investment in the next period, 
but do not sell securitized assets to noise traders, because there is underpricing. In t=2, 
banks cannot buy underpriced securitized assets from noise traders (they did not buy at 
t=1) and therefore they are left with money to finance investment projects, so there is 
little credit supply instability. In the third scenario, banks do nothing in t=1, so there are 
no securitized assets available. In t=2 banks lend all their money to entrepreneurs but do 
not sell securitized assets. So, again, strong credit supply cyclicality appears because 
they concentrate all lending in a single period. 
 
In summary, although the situation is not as clear as was with overpricing, underpricing 
favors credit supply cyclicality in most cases. 
 
Finally, we comment the case P1 > P and P2 < P, overvaluation followed by 
undervaluation. Overvaluation incentives strong lending cyclicality. All investment and 
securitization concentrate in period 1 and therefore a credit crunch ensues in period 220.  
 
Securitization raises the overall level of investment. But mispricing in the market for 
securitized assets also increases lending cyclicality. Besides, vagaries in the investor’s 
sentiment (or changes in the regulatory framework) may influence the level of activity 
in the real economy through its relationship with the banking sector. This situation is 
more likely when securitized assets are overpriced. 
 
3.3. Retained Profits and Capital Requirements 
 
In this section, we talk about what happens when banking regulations impose g < 1 in 
t=1 and therefore cash reserves are available for investment in t=2. We assume that the 
bank granted loans and sold some of them to noise traders in t=1. We assume also P2 < 
P. In this case, the income from financing new investment projects is f for each project, 
                                                          
20 The results in the case of P1 < P and P2 > P suggest an increase in banking instability. 
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while the profit from buying undervalued securities is (P –P2). The bank chooses the 
most profitable investment. Thus, the deeper the underpricing in t=2, the stronger the 
bank’s incentive to buy distressed securities, at the expenses of direct lending to 
entrepreneurs.  This situation favors lending cyclicality.  
 
The regulatory capital rules may generate strong incentives to securitize. For instance, if 
capital requirements on a class of loans are higher than other similar loans, banks will 
have an incentive to securitize that loan. With capital requirements with a capital-asset 
ratio e = Et/Nt , an increase in e increases the incentive to remove capital-intensive loans 
from the balance sheet which will lead to greater securitization. Similar to the case of 
reserve requirements, the regulations may force different e ratios in different periods. 
For instance, if the regulations at the beginning of the period t=1 stablish that e in period 
1 will be lower than in period 2, banks have the incentive to originate and securitize in 
the latter period. This favors credit cyclicality.   Summing up, securitization together 
with overpricing in the market of securitized assets encourages lending cyclicality and 
credit crunches. The provision of bank financing becomes more unstable. This situation 
may be further exacerbated by banking regulations such as dynamic provisioning.  
 
 
3.4. Leverage  
 
The bank can get additional funds borrowing short-term in the market and adjust to a 
haircut h. In this section, we concentrate on P1 = P and P2 <P. 
 
3.4.1. Securitization with Short-term Borrowing 
 
We assume that a bank which holds financial assets can borrow short-term in the market 
by using them as collateral. Lenders can always liquidate collateral if they want to be 
fully repaid and so, they want a zero interest rate. The mechanism to keep the borrowed 
money safe is the haircut h that the bank must meet. When the bank uses all its 
resources in t=1 as collateral, then the haircut is set as  
 
E1/(E1+L1) =E2/(E2+L2) = h  (7) 
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We first address the situation when at t=1 there is no market mispricing (P1 = P) and the 
bank has equity E0 and borrows L1=(1-h)J1. Without securitization, the bank uses the 
total amount E0+L1 to finance investment projects, so the total number of projects is 
E0+L1=N. With securitization, the bank can finance N=(E0+L1)/d projects and keep Nd 
securities on its books as skin in the game. The bank must maintain the haircut h as 
required by its creditors and therefore h= E1/(E1+L1). Solving for the equilibrium 
number of projects we get that N=E1/dh, and the collateral is J1= Nd which implies 
E0=E1 or in other words, the equity the banks have at the beginning and at the end of 
t=1 does not change because no change appears in the market values of the securitized 
debt. A bank with securitization but no leverage finances N=E0/d projects and with 
leverage finances N=E0/dh which is higher
21. 
 
In the second period there is underpricing in the securitized assets market, i.e.  P2 < P. 
As shown in section 3.2.3.2., the optimal strategy when P-P2 > 0 is always not to 
securitize. However, to maintain the haircut at the required levels the bank must sell 
securities. Consider the bank sells S securities, so at the end of period 2, its collateral is 
J1 – S worth (E1/h-S)P2. The bank uses the proceeds from selling S securities to repay 
loans for an amount of SP2, so the bank still owes L2 = L1 – SP2.  Is easy to see that the 
optimal amount to sell is  S=J1Q where 
 
Q=((1-P2)/P2)((1-h)/h)        (8) 
 
And where the impact on that part of the haircut on the market price is negative i.e. 
dS/dh < 0 dS/dP2 <0 
 
The bank must liquidate a fraction Q of its collateral. Notice that the two polar cases are 
h=1 (no liquidation) and P2 = 1-h (full liquidation). Remembering that P=(1-Z ) and 
that P > P2 the implication is that h > Z  i.e. they set the haircut above the default 
probability. Abstracting from the extreme cases, falling prices and decreases in haircuts 
suggest faster portfolio liquidations.   
 
                                                          
21 For instance, with h=0.2 and d=0.2 the bank finances 25 times its equity value when there is 
securitization and leverage but only 5 times its equity if only securitization is allowed. 
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Leverage changes the situation with respect to the simple securitization. First, the 
volume of real activity increases because the banks finance more projects. Second, 
banks sell securities when the prices of securitized assets decline. This selling puts 
further pressure on falling prices. 
 
3.5. Credit Default Swaps 
 
In this section, we talk about the consequences of introducing credit risk insurance 
(CDS) in the market for securitized loans and in the market for investment projects. The 
bank can buy or sell any amount of CDSs in the financial markets. The price of the CDS 
(spread) is s. The bank can buy or sell any amount of CDSs in the financial markets if  
the bank has enough collateral available. Given that the probability of default is Z   the 
zero-profit rule for all banks implies that the no-arbitrage CDS price is  
 
s  = Z  w  (9) 
 
Whereas w is the loss given default, see Duffee and Zhou (2001). 
 
We introduce here the concept of the CDS basis, we define as s – f.  The CDS-bond 
basis for a maturity measures the difference between the credit default swap spread of a 
specific company and the credit spread paid on a bond of the same company, both 
instruments having the same maturity. In empirical studies, they usually define the basis 
as the difference between the price of the CDS and the price of the asset swap, which is 
a proxy for the conventional bond yield spread. Since the asset swap derives from a 
floating rate par bond, its price is more comparable to the CDS premium. The bond 
spread is the standard measure of corporate financing costs. In our model corporate 
financing costs are summarized by f. With no frictions in the corresponding markets, the 
CDS basis should be zero. 
 
 Technical and market factors (Choudry, 2006) favour a small positive basis in normal 
times. The factors favouring positive basis can be technical such as high-quality loans 
(θZ ≈ 0), non-standard credit events included in the CDS contract (CDS offers excess 
protection), cheapest to deliver option (CDS are more valuable), loans trading below 
par, funding costs below Libor and low counterparty risk. Additionally, there are market 
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factors favouring positive basis: strong demand from protection buyers, liquidity 
premium (CDS is more liquid than a loan or a bond) and a shortage of cash assets 
among others. The empirical evidence on the size and sign of the basis22 for corporate 
issuers suggests that, on average, in normal times is positive and small (about +5 bps for 
Investment Grade firms and +30 bps for High Yield firms). However, in crisis periods 
(e.g. 2007-2009), the basis becomes negative (about -250 bps for Investment Grade 
firms and -650 bps for High Yield firms). Reasons for a negative basis are (among 
others) strong increases in financing costs, reductions in liquidity and increases in the 
counterparty risk of the protection sellers. 
 
 
3.5.1. Trading in CDSs versus Loans to Entrepreneurs 
 
If the bank uses all its balance sheet in t=1 to lend to entrepreneurs, the bank uses all its 
equity E0 to finance N=E0 projects and keeps all of them on its books until maturity. For 
each loan, the bank’s profits are +f-1 (loan origination) and (1-θZ ) (expected payoff at 
maturity). Therefore, the total expected profit is f – θZ.  
 
If instead of giving loans to entrepreneurs, the bank gets exposure to credit risk by 
selling CDSs, the bank collects the CDS premium and sets aside €1 of its equity as 
collateral for each contract. The expected profit per contract is s – θZ. The no arbitrage 
rule across markets implies that s = f = θZ. Therefore, with fairly priced CDSs, the bank 
is indifferent between lending to entrepreneurs and selling CDSs, because in all cases 
the expected profit is zero.  
 
Banks may decide between traditional lending and buying CDS when the basis is 
negative, but they prefer to sell CDS (with full collateralization) when the basis is 
positive. In the former case there is more investment and more economic growth if 
banks lend money to entrepreneurs, but no effect on the real economy if they buy CDS. 
If they sell CDS, there is less investment and less economic activity because the bank 
uses its funds as collateral to the CDS. In normal times the basis is positive and low for 
high quality creditors, and positive and moderate for less creditworthy reference 
                                                          
22 Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005), De Wit (2006), Trapp (2009), Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) 
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names23. Therefore, in this normal situation, CDS affects lending to high-quality 
obligors but may restrict lending to less creditworthy projects24. If the basis becomes 
negative, no incentive appears to sell CDS. But is profitable to buy them because they 
are underpriced. This buying activity decreases the funds available for funding 
investment projects25. In summary, in most market situations, CDS reduces the amount 
of funding available to entrepreneurs and acts as a catalyst for a cut in lending,  to high-
risk borrowers. 
 
 
3.5.2. Sales of CDSs versus Purchases of Securitized Assets  
 
In what follows we analyze the case where P1 = P and   P2 < P . We assume that at t=1 
the bank gives loans to entrepreneurs and sells securitized assets in the market. We also 
assume that the bank keeps the money to invest in period 2 ( i.e.  0 < w < 1). In t=2, the 
profits from buying underpriced securitized assets are  (P- P2). The profit from selling 
CDSs is s. Comparing the profits from buying loans regarding the profits from selling 
CDSs it easy to see26 that, for fairly priced CDSs, buying securitized assets or selling 
CDS are equally profitable with high-quality projects (default probability lower than 
0.5). However, with riskier projects (default probability higher than 0.5), selling CDS is 
always preferable to buying securitized assets27. In these cases, we are in a situation 
where the loan market is decoupled from the CDS market, a situation that has been 
observed in times of severe financial distress, when default risk increases for most 
projects (Andriztky and Singh, 2007, Alexopoulou, Andersson, and Georgescu, 2009). 
In this scenario, selling CDS does not add liquidity to the securitized loan market, on 
the contrary, this selling activity decreases market liquidity. When the banks sell CDS 
                                                          
23 Trapp (2009) reports that for a sample of CDS, from June 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007, the average basis is 
2.74 b.p. for investment grade bonds, but this average is 54.61 for non-investment grade bonds. 
24 This result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Ashcraft and Santos (2009). They find that, 
following the introduction of CDS in a sample of US firms, borrowing costs increase for low-credit-
quality reference names, while these costs decreased for high-credit-quality reference names.  
25 The basis was significantly and persistently negative for most reference names during the GFC 2007-
09, see Augustin et al. (2014) 
26 The profit from a loan purchase is P-P2 and the profit from selling a CDS is s. Given the assumptions in 
the model, P = (1 – θZ ) and fairly priced CDS implies s= θZ. Equating both profit equations implies that 
the non-negative market price must be  P2 = 1 - 2θZ which implies θZ ≤ 0.5. If  θZ > 0.5, then s > P-P2 
because of the non-negativity constraint P2 ≥ 0. 
27 This is consistent with the evidence in Hirtle (2009) who suggests that the benefits of the growth of 
credit derivatives apply mainly to large and relatively safe firms.  
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protection, they go long in credit risk, equivalent to purchasing the loan. Does not   
make much economic sense buying loans, because that would double the position size. 
 
Another situation when the bank has an incentive to sell CDSs instead of buying loans 
is when the capital rules set a high capital-asset ratio e = Et/Nt , implying that buying 
loans requires increases in equity.  Here, selling CDSs does not suffer from these 
problems.  
 
In summary, mispricing in the securitized assets market implies that trading in CDS will 
decrease the liquidity of the securitized assets, and especially those based on 
investments exposed to high credit risk. 
 
 
3.5.3. Trading in CDS versus Sales of Securitized Assets 
 
 The bank has an incentive to sell assets, i.e. to securitize loans at t = 1, 2 only if the 
difference between market price and fundamental value is profitable enough, i.e.  when  
Pt – P > 1 - f.  If this is the case, the bank sells loans and collects profits defined as Bt = 
(Pt - P)(1-d) per loan. The bank can also consider keeping the loans in its balance sheet 
and buy credit insurance instead of securitizing. Notice that if the bank does so, the 
number of financed projects N must be E0 /(1+s) instead of E0, so a lower number of 
projects get finance and there is an effect of reduced investment in the economy.  
 
If the bank buys CDS, pays the spread s and receives Ri in period 3. For instance when 
P1 = P and  P2  >P the profits from securitizing loans are B2 = (P2 - P)(1-d) and the 
expected profit in t=3 is E(B3) = 0. The profit from keeping the loan in the books and 
buying CDS is B2 = -s and the expected profit in t=3 is E(B3) = 1 because either the loan 
does not default and the entrepreneur repays €1 or the loan defaults and then the 
protection seller28 pays €1.Comparing the profits from securitizing loans regarding the 
profits from buying fairly priced CDS  is easy to see29 that, for high quality loans, which 
                                                          
28 We assume no counterparty risk 
29 The profits from securitization are (P2 – P)(1-d) and the profits from buying CDS are -s + 1.  Given the 
assumptions in the model, fairly priced CDS implies s= θZ. Equating both profit equations gives the 
condition (P2 – P)(1-d) = 1- θZ. For instance, in the case of a high quality loan where d = 0.1, and where 
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require small skin in the game and where the overpricing in the loan market is small, the 
bank prefers to keep the loans in the balance sheet and hedge their credit risk buying 
CDSs. Therefore, banks cut overall investment and economic activity slows down. large 
overpricing of bad quality loans tilts the balance towards securitization. The empirical 
implication of these results is that we should observe more demand for CDS protection 
in the case where the reference entity is of high quality and trades in a liquid market 
with a small basis. We should observe more securitization activities with low-quality 
loans traded in illiquid or informationally inefficient markets. 
 
3.5.4. Purchases of Naked CDS  
 
This is a speculative strategy which implies using the entire bank’s equity as payments 
for buying credit protection and they finance no investment projects, which implies an 
immediate negative effect on the volume of investment in the economy. The number of 
CDS contracts bought is equal to E0/s  , and given that the spread s  is lower than one, 
the notional amount of protection bought is much larger than the number of projects that 
the bank would finance if the bank lends to entrepreneurs30. 
 
When the bank buys naked CDS, pays the spread s and receives Ri in period 3. Suppose 
we are in t=2. The cost of buying one CDS is s and the expected profit is the payoff €1 
times the default probability   that is Z .  This situation of a negative basis may 
appear when the funding costs explode over Libor or if the counterparty risk in the CDS 
market increases, among other markets factors (e.g. liquidity crunches). This has been 
the case in the crisis period 2007-2009. 
 
These situations (steeper financing costs, high counterparty risk, and low liquidity) are 
usually associated with episodes of market stress. Is in those periods when buying 
naked CDSs become more attractive to banks. The economic consequences are a cut in 
investment in the real economy. Therefore, in situations of financial distress, trading in 
CDS increases credit restrictions, credit supply instability, and underinvestment. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(P2 – P) = 0.1 and θZ = 0.2 it is clearly preferable to keep the loan and hedge its credit risk with a fairly 
priced CDS. 
30 Norden and Radoeva (2013) study the CDS volume on a firm that exceeds its outstanding debt. This 
naked CDS volume indicates speculation since hedging can be ruled out. They provide evidence of 
substantial speculation in the CDS market. The mean ratio of the firm-specific CDS volume to total debt 
is 3.6 and the maximum is 65.   
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The conclusions from this paper give a nuanced answer to whether CDSs are helpful or 
harmful in aggregate economic terms. If the markets for securitized assets and credit 
risk protection are informatively efficient, the CDS are redundant securities with very 
small impact on the cyclicality of the credit supply and on the volatility of economic 
growth. 
 
The mispricing of assets traded in these markets creates incentives for banks to engage 
in trading. This trading has effects on the real economy through its impact on the 
lending channel because banks engage in trading using funds which, in normal 
circumstances, should be invested in projects of the real economy. Therefore, 
mispricing of (credit-risk-sensitive) financial assets have effects in the real economy. 
Our main conclusions are 
 
1) Unlevered securitization together with mispricing of securitized assets boosts 
lending cyclicality, particularly when overpricing appears.  
2) Levered securitization increases the volume of real activity and the profits of 
banks, but banks sell securities when markets decline. This selling exacerbates 
downward movements in the securitized assets market. 
3) With mispriced CDS or securitized assets, trading in CDS reduces the amount of 
funding available to real-economy projects, in special those with high default 
risk.  
4) Trading in CDS decreases the liquidity of the securitized assets, and especially 
the liquidity of assets based on investments with high credit risk.   
5) Trading in naked CDS decreases the amount of financing available to real-
economy projects, especially in situations of economy-wide financial stress. 
 
Some empirical implications of the above results are worth noting. First, when the CDS 
basis is close to zero the impact of CDS on lending cyclicality, securitization, and 
economic activity is unlikely to be very relevant. However, the higher (in absolute 
value) the basis, the stronger the CDS impact is likely to be on lending cyclicality, 
securitization, and economic activity. Second, the impact of CDS should be stronger if 
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the credit quality of the reference name is relatively low. Third, we should see an 
increase in the relative volume in the CDS market, in comparison with the lending and 
securitization markets, when financial stress increases across the economy.  
 
Looking forward, introducing heterogeneous agents in the model may yield more 
insights. Allowing for uncertainty in banks’ information set may give more general 
results. For instance, uncertainty of the banks’ knowledge of whether an asset is 
mispriced. Asset prices may also be endogenous and dependent on the economic cycle. 
A generalization of the model allowing for a welfare analysis including externalities and 
the specific social benefits and costs of CDS trading is an interesting research area. An 
important aspect, which our model does not consider, is that banks can use CDS for 
other purposes (e.g. regulatory capital relief) that can incentivize its use, see 
Yorulmazer (2013) and the empirical evidence on European banks in Thornton and di 
Tommaso (2018) suggesting that CDS are used for regulatory arbitrage to lower capital 
rules and boost risk taking. We leave all these topics for future research. 
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